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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

A.

What is the evidentiary threshold of the terms ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’
when proving crimes against humanity in the Cambodian context?

Various members of the Khmer Rouge have come under scrutiny for the atrocities
committed in Cambodia during the period of 1975-1979, which resulted in an estimated 1.7
million deaths. To be convicted of crimes against humanity, the statute of the ECCC requires
that the attack upon a civilian population must be “part of a widespread or systematic attack.” In
this paper, I will address what is the threshold of the terms “widespread” and “systematic.”

B.

Summary of Conclusions

1.

To be considered a ‘widespread’ attack, the act should be committed on a
large scale and involve the “cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts
or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.”

2.

The number of victims and the scale of the acts is also taken into
consideration, although the number of victims is not conclusive of whether
an act is “widespread”.

3.

Although “widespread” may be defined as “massive, frequent, large scale
action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed
against a multiplicity of victims,” courts have held that one single act, if it

1

is part of the widespread attack, satisfies the threshold for a widespread
attack.

4.

The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population,
the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation
of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of crimes, could
be taken into account to determine whether the attack satisfies either or
both requirements of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack vis-à-vis the
civilian population.

5.

Where numerous civilians were killed, public and private property was
plundered, and unlawful attacks on civilians occurred, the nature of the
attacks were sufficient to constitute a widespread attack since they “took
many forms.”

6.

An attack triggered the “widespread” threshold where the attacks spread to
three different municipalities leading to thousands of people affected by
the attacks.

7.

An attack can trigger the threshold of a widespread attack where there is
evidence of daily attacks leading to thousands of people affected by the
attacks.

2

8.

In the Cambodian context, the acts committed by various members of the
Khmer Rouge would satisfy the requirement for a widespread attack since
they made up part of a broader attack upon the population.

9.

To be considered a ‘systematic’ attack, it requires “an organized nature of
the acts and the improbability of their random occurrence.” Furthermore,
“patterns of crimes—that is the non-accidental repetition of similar
criminal conduct on a regular basis—are a common expression of [a]
systematic occurrence.”

10.

The systematic threshold was also triggered where the media promoted
ethnic hatred and weapons were brought into the country for the purpose
of eradicating a group of people.

11.

Where an attack “took many forms,” the systematic threshold has been
triggered.

12.

The systematic threshold was triggered where the objective of the
attackers was clear, evidenced by chants of, “Lets exterminate them!”

13.

In the Cambodian context, overwhelming evidence suggests that the acts
were systematic or part of a systematic attack upon the population.

3

II.

Factual Background

Between 1975-1979, as many as two million people were executed by the Khmer Rouge.1
Undoubtedly, this was one of the worst tragedies of the twentieth century. The time has come to
prosecute those most responsible for these atrocities. This memo will address the roles of
various high-ranking officials of the Khmer Rouge and evaluate the threshold of the terms
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ and whether their conduct fit into these terms.
The leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, with his attempts to create a classless society2 died in
1998 before receiving a trial for his crimes.3 However, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan,
and Kae Pok are some individuals who have come under a lot of scrutiny for their leading roles
during the 1975-1979 executions4. They had policies in place to target members of three groups:
people associated with the former Khmer Republic, non-Communist members of the Cambodian
population, and party members within the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) suspected of
being traitors.5 After reviewing evidence against these individuals, it is clear that these
individuals “are criminally responsible for planning or implementing these policies.” 6 More

1

Stephen Heder and Brian D. Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the
Khmer Rouge, Documentation Series No. 4, Documentation Centre of Cambodia, 7 (2001) [Reproduced in notebook
at Tab 1]. However, some estimates have been 1.5-1.7 million people executed during the period of 1975-1979. See
also: Patrick Dilger, Back to the “Killing Fields,” Yale Alumni Magazine,
http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/96_04/cambodia.htm (1996). [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 2];
Katheryn M. Klein, Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in
Cambodia, 4 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 549, (2006) [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 3].
2

Dilger, supra. note 1.

3

Klein, supra note 1, at 549.
Heder, supra. note 1, at 5.
5
Id.
6
Id.
4

4

specifically, the evidence shows at least three policies of mass execution adopted by some or all
of these high-ranking officials.7
First, Pol Pot along with Nuon Chea and Son Sen decided to implement a policy to kill all
Khmer Republic military officers and senior civil servants.8 Second, another policy to execute
“those allegedly guilty of serious crimes against the revolution” was implemented by Zone,
Sector, District and cooperative forces.9 Finally, another decision made by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea,
and Son Sen was to execute all cadre members who could be forced to confess to being traitors
of the Khmer Rouge.10 As to this last policy, a lot of cadre officials were tortured into
confessing that they were traitors of the Khmer Rouge.11
With this background, this memo will go into more factual detail of the atrocities
committed by these individuals as it becomes necessary in order to evaluate their actions and
whether they constitute a widespread and/or systematic attack on the civilian population.

III.

Widespread
“Widespread” is a term that is used by various international statutes when proving crimes

against humanity. The word appears in the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court.12 The word also appears in the same context in many other statutes from other

7

Id. at 26. See also: Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer
Rouge, 1975-1979, 2nd Edition, Yale University Press, 1996 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 4].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 27. See also: Ker Munthit, Khmer Rouge Official to Reveal Crimes, The Associated Press, available at
http://cambodiana.org/cambodianaorg.aspx. August 1, 2007, article # 38[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 5].
12
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M . 999 [hereinafter ICC Statute],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. “ ‘Crimes against
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: a). Murder; b). Extermination; c). Enslavement; d).
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; e). Imprisonment . . . f). Torture; g). Rape . . . h). Persecution against
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . .i). Enforced

5

international tribunals13 and even where it was not mentioned in a statute, courts have required
that in order to prove crimes against humanity, the perpetrator must commit the enumerated
crimes as “part of a widespread or systematic attack.”14
Various U.N. Tribunals have interpreted the word to mean virtually the same thing. In
the ICTY, “widespread” refers to an act “committed on a large scale by the ‘cumulative effect of
a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.’”
15

Also, “the widespread characteristic refers to the scale of the acts perpetrated and to the

number of victims.”16 In addition, courts have taken the view that “a single act has comprised a
crime against humanity when it occurred within the necessary context. An isolated act,
however—i.e. an atrocity which did not occur within such a context—cannot.” 17 However, a
“single isolated act by a perpetrator, if linked to a widespread or systematic attack, could

disappearance of persons; j). The crime of apartheid; k). Other inhumane acts . . .” [Reproduced in notebook at
Tabs 6-8].
13
All of the following statutes have the exact language, “as part of a widespread or systematic attack.” See: Statute
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; East Timor
Regulation No. 2000/15, art. 3, s.5; Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, art.5
[hereinafter ECCC Statute] [All reproduced in notebook at Tabs 6-8].
14

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter
ICTY Statute] [Reproduced in notebook at Tabs 6-8]. Article 5 does not mention “widespread,” however, many
cases require it. Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, IT-98-34-T, 31, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003,
para. 236: “The attack must be either widespread or systematic in nature.” [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 37]. See
also: Simon Chesterman, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 307, 313 (2000) [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 9] citing
Prosecutor v. Tadic IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 648. “The words ‘widespread or
systematic’ do not appear in the ICTY Statute [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 10].

15

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 179.
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 11].
16
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 206. [Reproduced in notebook at
Tab 12].
17
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 550. [Reproduced in
notebook at Tab 13].
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constitute a crime against humanity.”18 The attack against the civilian population is what must
be widespread, and “not the individual acts of the accused.”19
In the ICTR, “widespread” is defined as, “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”20
In order to be ‘part of’ a widespread attack, the prosecutor must show that the accused knew his
acts were part of a widespread attack. In other words, the accused must know the broader picture
in which his/her actions took place.21 This knowledge requirement can be proved from
circumstantial evidence such as a perpetrator’s voluntary assumption of an important role within
the frameworks of a broader criminal campaign, his participation in the illegal acts, the scale of
the illegal acts, public knowledge, or media coverage to name a few.22 Furthermore, even though

18

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, at para. 178
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 11]. See also: Mohamed Elewa Badar, 5 San Diego Int’l L.J. 73, 89 (2004)
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 14] citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal
Law, (2d rev. ed., 1999).
19

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, para. 96.
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 15]. See also: Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 26 February 2001, at para. 94 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 11]; Prosecutor v. Blaskic IT-95-12-A,
Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 101 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 12].

20

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580 [Reproduced in
notebook at Tab 16]. See also: Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999,
para. 69 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 17]; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 21
May 1999 para. 123. “A widespread attack is one that is directed against a multiplicity of victims.” [Reproduced in
notebook at Tab 18].
21

Chesterman, supra note 14, at 318. [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 9] citing Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 649 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 10]. “Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge,
either actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit
his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population, that is sufficient to
hold him liable for crimes against humanity. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the
civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict.” See also: Badar, supra note 18, at 98.
22
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 259 [Reproduced in notebook at
Tab 12].
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“widespread” refers to the number of victims and massive, large-scale actions, it is not necessary
that the action in question involve many victims.23
It is important to note that there is no “conclusive authority on how many murders
constitute [crimes against humanity],” according to the Court in the Kamuhanda case.24 They
also emphasized that a widespread attack does not “suggest a numeric minimum.”25 Therefore,
one can infer from this ruling that triggering the ‘widespread’ threshold depends on a case by
case analysis.
In addition, it is also important to note that in proving crimes against humanity, it is not
necessary to prove that the acts were both, widespread and systematic. Rather, as the various
statutes indicate, they are disjunctive rather than conjunctive.26 Furthermore, various cases in the
ICTR and the ICTY have also supported this conclusion that the requirements are disjunctive
(See footnote).27

A. Case law in East Timor

23

Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 237, 251 (2002) [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 19] citing
Tadic, IT-94-1 at para. 649. [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 10].

24

Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 22 January 2004, para. 692.
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 20].

25

Id.

26

ECCC Statute, art. 5. “. . .any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack.” [Reproduced in
notebook at Tabs 6-8]. See also: ICTR Statute, Art. 3; ICTY Statute, Art. 5; ICC Statute, Art. 7 [Reproduced in
notebook at Tabs 6-8].

27

Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 1 September 2004 para. 135 [Reproduced in
notebook at Tab 21]; Prosecutor v.Stakic, IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 628.
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 22], Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September
1998, para. 579 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 16], Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1, Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 21 May 1999 para. 123 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 18]
.
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In East Timor, following a vote for independence by the East Timorese, roughly 200,000
people were forcibly transferred from their homes into West Timor and as many as 2,000 people
were killed during the altercation.28 In the Prosecutor v. Marques, Joni Marques and Gilberto
Fernandes were charged with the torture and murder of Evaristo Lopes, an independence
supporter.29 The Court, in determining that the acts were part of a widespread attack, noted:
“[The] conduct of the accuseds [was] part of the activities of Team Alfa, a militia group, which
was committed to, attacks upon the civilian population, and in particular, members of the
population who supported independence.”30 The Court also noted that all the accused
“committed the crimes with full knowledge of Team Alfa’s purpose.”31 That purpose was to
attack the people who were pro-independence supporters.32 “The perpetrator must only be aware
of the risk that an attack exists and the risk that certain circumstances of the attack mean that his
conduct adds to the atmosphere for other crimes. The knowledge of details is not required.”33
The Court also took the approach of the cases of the ICTR and the ICTY discussed below in
ascertaining what constitutes a “widespread” attack.34 Therefore, even one act of murder can
constitute a crime against humanity if it is committed as part of a broader attack.

28

Information Release from the Serious Crimes Unit, available at http://www.etan.org/et2003/february/2328/28info.htm. [Reproduced in notebook at Tab 23].
29

Prosecutor v. Marques et. al., Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 09/2000, Dili District Court, p. 13, 11
December 2001. Available at: http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/judgmentspdf/LPEnglish.pdf. [Reproduced in notebook
at Tab 24].
30

Id. at 12.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 21.
34
Id. at p. 17. “With regard to the alternative context, a widespread attack, most of the decisions of the ad hoc
tribunals simply focus on the scale of the attack or the number of victims. At the ICTY, the Tadic Trial Chamber,
defined the widespread attack as referring ”to the [large] number of victims’. (Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 648.)
Similarly, at the ICTR, the tribunal in Kayishema held that a widespread attack must be ‘directed against a
multiplicity of victims(Kayishema Trial Judgement,para. 123.).’ At the ICTY, the Court in Blaskic went further by
saying that: ‘A crime may be widespread or committed on a large-scale by ‘the cumulative effect of a series of
31
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B. Cases in the ICTR
With estimates as high as 1 million Tutsi in Rwanda massacred in 1994, this
approximated roughly 75% of the Tutsi population in Rwanda.35
In one of the leading case in the ICTR, Jean Paul Akayesu was convicted of crimes
against humanity where he was responsible for the deaths of 2,000 people in his commune.36
Akayesu had the responsibility to maintain law and order in his commune, however, he failed to
do so which resulted in the 2,000 deaths.37 According to the indictment, Akayesu was
responsible for the deaths of about 2,000 Tutsis while he was still in power.38 The Court relied
on testimony from a couple different experts to arrive at the conclusion that the acts were
“widespread”.39 The experts stated that:
Dr. Zachariah witnessed attacks on civilian populations, and killings of civilians. He
recounted visiting Kibeho Church on 16 April 1994, where two to four thousand Tutsi
civilians were apparently killed, and Butare on 17 April 1994, where a Burundian Tutsi
was apparently beaten to death at a checkpoint, and where his purchase officer reported
seeing the bodies of 5-10 dead civilians at every checkpoint on the road from Kigali . . .
Dr. Zachariah testified that he saw a group of 60 to 80 civilians fleeing towards the
Burundian border, from men armed with machetes. He stated that most of these civilians
were hacked to death before they reached the border . . .[Lindsey Hilston] estimated that
the pile [of bodies] outside the morgue contained about five hundred bodies, with more
bodies being brought in all the time by pickup trucks . . . Mr. Cox saw and filmed corpses
floating by at the rate of several corpses per minute . . . he saw some 800 Tutsi civilians
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‘in a desperate, desperate state’, many apparently starving and with severe machete and
bullet wounds, and with a great many corpses strewn all over the hills.40
After reviewing this information, the Court decided whether these acts constituted a widespread
attack pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, stating:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds:
a) Murder;
b) Extermination;
c) Enslavement;
d) Deportation;
e) Imprisonment;
f) Torture;
g) Rape;
h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) Other inhumane acts.41
The Court found that it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that at least 2,000 people
were killed in Taba.42 The Court, in applying this statute to the facts in the case stated that:
The scale of the attack was extraordinary. Defence counsel called the events which took
place in Rwanda in 1994 ‘the greatest human tragedy’ at the end of this century. Around
the country, a massive number of killings took place within a very short time frame. Tutsi
were clearly the target of the attack - at roadblocks, in shelters, and in their own homes.
Hutu sympathetic to or supportive of Tutsi were also massacred . . . For these reasons, the
Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a widespread and systematic attack began
in April 1994 in Rwanda43
Akayesu acknowledged that he knew that the Tutsi were being killed.44 Accordingly, Akayesu
was convicted of crimes against humanity where he ordered the killing of Simon Mutijima,
Thaddee Uwanyiligra, and Jean Chrysostome.45 The Court held that this was part of a
40
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widespread attack. Therefore, we have a case where the killing of three people constituted part
of a widespread attack on the civilian population and where 2,000 people constituted a
widespread attack.
Another case in the ICTR supports the Akayesu decision. In Niyitegeka, the Court ruled
that if it is proven that the accused knew that his act was part of a widespread or systematic
attack, then it is only necessary to show that the accused committed a crime against one person.46
The Court found that there was a widespread attack in Kibuye Prefecture where:
There is evidence of daily attacks in Bisesero against the Tutsi seeking shelter there,
leading to thousands of Tutsi being killed, and of a large number of corpses in Kibuye
town at the relevant time, the corpses being that of Tutsi refugees.47

Niyitegeka encouraged “the killing, decapitation and castration of Kabanda, and the piercing of
his skull, and his association with the attackers who carried out these acts”48 Thus, Niyitegeka
was found responsible “for inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread and systematic
attack on the civilian Tutsi population on ethnic grounds and as such [Niyitegeka’s acts]
constitute a crime against humanity.”49
Thus, the previous cases illustrate that the commission of one single crime, if the
perpetrator has knowledge that the crime is part of a widespread attack, can satisfy the
“widespread” requirement. The killing of thousands of Tutsi in Kibuye Prefecture constituted
the widespread attack of which Niyitegeka had knowledge. Thus, the commission of even one
single crime, according to the ICTR, satisfied the requirement that the crime must be part of a
widespread attack.
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C.

Cases in the ICTY
In 1992, the world came to realize that concentration camps similar to the ones during

World War II in Germany were being utilized in the former Yugoslavia.50 There, 250,000
civilians were murdered in the conflict, 20,000 women raped, and two million people driven
from their homes.51 When the ICTY was established, Dusko Tadic was among the first to be
charged for these atrocities.52
Count nine of the indictment charged Tadic with crimes against humanity for the killings
of four men from the village of Jaskici.53 Tadic was also charged with crimes against humanity
for the beating of Sefik Sivac.54 In reaching the conclusion that the attacks were “widespread”,
the Court noted that:
Between March and May 1992, there were several attacks and take-overs by the
[Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)] of areas that constituted main entry points into Bosnia
or were situated on major logistics or communications lines such as those in Bosanski
Brod, Derventa and Bijeljina, Kupres, Foca and Avornik, Visegrad, Bosanski Samac,
Vlasencia, Brcko and Prijedor. The first attack was in Bosanski Brod on 27 March 1992.
At the same time, there were clashes at Derventa. On 2 April 1992 there was an incident
at Bijeljina and around this time also at Kupres. These were immediately prior to the
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on 7 April 1992 by the European
Community, with a retroactive date of 6 March 1992. In Bosanski Samac, the 4th
Detachment of the JNA entered the town, cut off telephones and fired shots in the town.
There was some non-Serb resistance quickly squelched by the arrival of JNA tanks and
armoured cars. On 22 April 1992 conflict began in Vlasencia with a police vehicle
driving through the streets announcing through a loudspeaker that all armaments were to
be surrendered. All vital functions of the town were taken over by JNA forces, including
the town hall, bank, post office, police and Courthouse, and there were present very many
uniformed men as well as some local Serbs with arms. On 29 April 1992 there was a
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bloodless take-over of the town of Prijedor, as noted elsewhere, and on 30 April 1992
two bridges were blown up by Serb forces in Brcko.55
Thus, since the attacks occurred in numerous different regions, this factored into the
Court’s decision that the attacks were “widespread”. The Court in Tadic found him
guilty of crimes against humanity since they reasoned that the murders were part of a
widespread attack.56 Tadic had knowledge that widespread attacks were occurring57 and
the Court held that his acts were part of the widespread attack.58 Therefore, we see again
that only one single act can constitute a crime against humanity if there is a larger picture
happening at the same time. The Court in Tadic, in reaching its decision, also cited the
Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision from the ICTY, stating:
Crimes against humanity. . .must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character.
However, as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an
individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims
might be recognized as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the
specific context . . .59

The threshold appears to be that one single act can constitute a crime against humanity if the act
was done in furtherance of other attacks. Furthermore, it is also where all the vital functions of
the town were taken over. To prove that the acts of the accused were done in furtherance of
55
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other attacks (part of a widespread attack), then the accused must have either actual knowledge
or constructive knowledge that other illegal acts were occurring on a widespread basis. The
Appeals Chamber in Tadic states:
The perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his
act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict.60

Tadic’s actions, the beating of Sivac, the murder of four men, and many others were
deemed to be part of this widespread attack. Even the beating of Sivac, irrespective of the other
charges, could satisfy the requirement of being part of a widespread attack.
In the Kunarac case, the Court ruled that the motives of the accused are irrelevant in
determining whether a crime against humanity has been committed.61 In addition, the Court
came up with a guideline in determining whether an act was “widespread”.62 The indictment
alleged that Kunarac raped several women while they were detained in an abandoned house.63
Kunarac was the commander of a special reconnaissance unit during the armed conflict between
the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in the spring of 1992.64 Serbian forces arrested Muslim
inhabitants of the towns and villages. The Muslim women were detained in houses and detention
centers and many were raped and sexually assaulted.65 The Court found Kunarac guilty of crimes
against humanity. In reaching its decision, the Court noted:
[T]he motives of the accused for taking part in the attack are irrelevant and a crime
against humanity may be committed for purely personal reasons.” Furthermore, the
accused need not share the purpose or goal behind the attack. It is also irrelevant whether
the accused intended his acts to be directed against the targeted population or merely
60
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against his victim. It is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must be directed
against the target population and the accused need only know that his acts are part
thereof. At most, evidence that he committed the acts for purely personal reasons could
be indicative of a rebuttable assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of
that attack.66

This Court is further explaining the excerpt from the Tadic decision, saying that an act can be
committed for purely personal reasons but as long as the act is related to the conflict, then one
can be liable for crimes against humanity.
In addition, Kunarac establishes that a single act could be deemed to be part of a
widespread attack if the accused knew that his acts were against the targeted population. In
assessing whether there was a widespread attack, the Kunarac Court also noted:
The assessment of what constitutes a ‘widespread ‘ or ‘systematic’ attack is essentially a
relative exercise in that it depends upon the civilian population which, allegedly, was
being attacked. The Court must therefore ‘first identify the population which is the object
of the attack and, in light of the means, methods, resources and result of the attack upon
the population, ascertain whether the attack was indeed widespread or systematic ”. The
consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, the number of victims, the
nature of the acts, the possible participation of officials or authorities or any identifiable
patterns of crimes, could be taken into account to determine whether the attack satisfies
either or both requirements of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack vis-à-vis this civilian
population.67

The Court held that there was a widespread attack where the Serb forces “target[ed] the Muslim
civilian population [and] encompass[ed] the municipalities of Foca, Gacko, and Kalinovik . .
.Muslim houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Muslim villagers
were rounded up or captured and sometimes beaten or killed in the process. Men and women
were separated, with many of the men detained in the . . .prison.”68 Thus, the extensive nature of
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these attacks triggered the “widespread” threshold even where the total number of victims was
not mentioned.
In the Stakic case, an attack triggered the “widespread” threshold where the attack
occurred “throughout the municipality of Prijedor, initially in Hambarine and Kozarac, and then
spread to the whole of the Brdo region.”69 In addition, “thousands of citizens of Prijedor
municipality passed through one or more of the three main detention camps . . .established in the
towns of Omarska, Prijedor, and Trnopolije.”70 The attack resulted in “hundreds of non-Serbs
killed and many more arrested and detained by the Serb authorities, inter alia in detention
facilities.”71 The “whole of the Brdo region” was sufficiently broad and large-scaled for the
Court to hold that the attacks occurring there constituted a widespread attack even though only
hundreds of non-Serbs were killed.
In the Krstic case, 25,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians were forcibly bussed outside of
Srebrenica and the women, children and elderly were transferred from Potocari to Kladanj.72
Krstic was found to be responsible for these forcible transportations and thus, convicted of
crimes against humanity partly because this satisfied the “widespread” requirement.73 The Court
in this case also addressed the massacre of 7,000 Bosnian Muslims and determined this to be a
“substantial part” of a group.74 Accordingly, the Court deemed this attack to trigger the
threshold of a “widespread” attack.75
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In the Limaj case, the Court ruled that there was not a widespread attack where between
100-140 Serbs were abducted.76 Limaj was charged with crimes allegedly committed by him
and other members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) from May to around 26 July 1998
against Serbian civilians and Kosovo Albanian civilians who were perceived as Serbian
collaborators in the Llapushnik/Lapusnik area in central Kosovo.77 The Court found that,
[E]ven if it be accepted that those civilians of whatever ethnicity believed to have been
abducted by the KLA in and around the relevant period were in truth so abducted, then,
nevertheless, in the context of the population of Kosovo as a whole the abductions were
relatively few in number and could not be said to amount to a “widespread” occurrence
for the purposes of Article 5 of the Statute.78
The Court ruled that there was no evidence that this was a widespread attack, although, they did
find evidence that it was systematic.79 More importantly, the abductions were not linked to the
attacks in Yugoslavia occurring at the time80 and, therefore, this was the reason the abductions
were not suffice as a single act committed as part of a widespread attack.
In the Brdjanin case, the Court held that there was a widespread attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian population in the Bosnian Krajina where the attack
“took many forms.”81 The Court noted that:
By the end of 1992, nearly all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had been dismissed
from their jobs in, amongst others, the media, the army, the police, the judiciary and
public companies. Numerous crimes were committed against Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, including murder, torture, beatings, rape, plunder and the destruction of
property. Villages were shelled, houses were torched and looted. In the spring of 1992, a
number of detention camps where Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians were
arrested and detained en masse were established throughout the ARK. In several
instances, mass killings of civilians took place.82
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Thus, the sheer large-scale of the attacks in the Bosnian Krajina in the Brdjanin case were
enough to satisfy the “widespread” threshold.

IV.

Systematic

This part of the analysis is geared towards analyzing the behavior of the perpetrators. In
the ICTY, systematic refers to “patterns of crimes—that is the non-accidental repetition of
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis—are a common expression of [a] systematic
occurrence.” 83 It also involves the “organized nature of the acts and the improbability of their
random occurrence.”84 The term ‘systematic’ “covers acts committed with deliberation or
planning . . .[it] addresses the organizational quality of the attack and the deliberate recurrence of
similar criminal conduct.”85 Moreover, the Blaskic Court tried to express a systematic attack as
requiring four elements:
[1] the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated
or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a
community; [2] the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of
civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one
another; [3] the preparation and use of significant public or private resources, whether
military or other; [4]the implication of high-level political and/or military authorities in
the definition and establishment of the methodical plan.86
These requirements have not been adhered to in the sense of requiring all four to be present,
however they can all be used as evidence toward a finding that a systematic attack existed. For
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example, the existence of a plan or policy would be relevant and assist in the determination of
whether there was a systematic attack, but it is not mandatory.87 In addition, the plan “need not
necessarily be declared expressly or even stated clearly and precisely.”88 Deciding whether an
attack is systematic can be determined by a variety of factors such as:
[a] the general historical circumstances and the overall political background against
which the criminal acts are set; [b] the establishment and implementation of autonomous
political structures at any level of authority in a given territory; [c] the general content of
a political programme, as it appears in the writings and speeches of its authors; [d] media
propaganda; [e] the establishment and implementation of autonomous military structures;
[f] the mobilization of armed forces; [g] temporally and geographically repeated and
coordinated military offensives; [h] links between the military hierarchy and the political
structure and its political programme; [i] alterations to the ‘ethnic’ composition of
populations; [j] discriminatory measures . . .[k]the scale of the acts of violence
perpetrated—in particular murders and other physical acts of violence, rape, arbitrary
imprisonment, deportations and expulsions or the destruction of non-military property, in
particular, sacral sites.89
The ICTR has interpreted the term “systematic” in the same manner as the ICTY. It includes an
attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy.90 Systematic refers to an organized
pattern of conduct, not a mere random occurrence, according to the Court in Akayesu.91
Furthermore, the total number of victims may be small (and thus, fails to constitute a widespread
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attack), however, as long as the defendant acted in a preconceived manner, this may be sufficient
to constitute a systematic attack.92 For example, it is suggested that killing a political or religious
leader could constitute a systematic attack even though the murder is not on a widespread
manner.93 The sections below will discuss how courts have interpreted the threshold of a
systematic attack.

A.

East Timor

In the Prosecutor v. Marques, the Court held that there was a systematic attack in the
East Timor context where a policy of targeting a class of persons was clearly identifiable. In
reaching its decision, the Court stated that:
The facts on this Indictment show a systematic attack. It was directed against Evaristo
Lopes (FALINTIL supporter). [It was directed against] the houses of villagers around
Leuro (CNRT members), upon Alexio Oliveira (CNRT supporter), Alfredo Araújo
(FALINTIL supporter), Kalistu Rodrigues (CNRT member and clandestine member of
FALINTIL), and the clergy (who were considered by Team Alfa to be supporters of
independence and disruptive to the campaign of autonomy). Over the six months, which
these facts cover, Team Alfa identified and chose its targets, systematically attacking proindependence supporters within the civilian population.94
The Court in this case looked to the ICTR and the ICTY for guidance in the definitions and
applications of the systematic principle.95 The policy of targeting supporters of independence
was clear and manifested by killing various independence supporters. As a result, the Court held
that this constituted a systematic attack.
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B.

Cases in the ICTR

Referring to the facts set forth from the Akayesu case in section III (C) of this memo, the
Court held that there was a systematic attack in that instance. The Court found that the
systematic attack was evidenced by the “unusually large shipments of machetes into the country
shortly before it occurred . . .the structured manner in which the attack took place; . . .[the fact
that] “teachers and intellectuals were targeted first; . . .and the fact that through the media and
other propaganda, Hutu were encouraged systematically to attack Tutsi.”96 The methodical
nature of the attacks justified the Court in determining it was “systematic” because of the
evidence that this was pursuant to a plan or policy to kill the Tutsi.
In the Kayishema case, the Court held that there was a systematic attack where radio
broadcasts promoted ethnic hatred, a civil defense program in Rwanda distributed 50,000
machetes for the purpose of exterminating the Tutsis, roadblocks were set up to weed out the
Tutsis, and top level Hutu “meticulously planned” the attacks on the Tutsi.97 In this case, a state
actor was involved, although it was not necessary. The roadblocks, radio broadcasts, and the
program which distributed the machetes used to kill Tutsis were also sufficient to trigger the
systematic threshold.
In the Musema case, a systematic attack has been held where the attackers were chanting,
"Let's exterminate them,” directed at the Tutsis.98 This, according to the Court, clearly
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demonstrated that the objective of the attackers was to destroy the Tutsis. Musema was the
Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory, was an educated man with political influence, ordered the
commission of crimes against members of the Tutsi group, and abetted in the crimes by
participating personally in them.99 The Court also noted that, “These attacks were pointedly
aimed at causing harm to and destroying the Tutsis. The victims, namely men, women and
children, were deliberately and systematically targeted on the basis of their membership in the
Tutsi ethnic group. Certain degrading acts were purposely intended to humiliate them for being
Tutsis.”100 Thus, the Court held that these acts collectively constituted a systematic attack.
Finally, in the Rutaganda case, an attack was found to trigger the systematic threshold
where meetings were held to organize and encourage the killings of Tutsis.101 The Tutsi were
targeted because they were considered to be opponents of the regime.102 An expert witness for
the prosecution testified of a plan formulated before 1994 which, according to the Court, was
convinced that the attacks where pre-planned.103 In concluding that the attack was systematic,
the Court noted the following evidence:
The Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence of meetings held to organise and
encourage the targeting and killings of the Tutsi civilian population. The Chamber also finds that
this organisation and encouragement took the form of radio broadcasts calling for the
apprehension of Tutsi, the use of mobile announcement units to spread propaganda messages
about the Inkontanyi, the distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe militia, the erection of
roadblocks manned by soldiers and members of the Interahamwe to facilitate the identification,
separation and subsequent killing of Tutsi civilians and, the house to house searches conducted
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to apprehend Tutsis, clearly suggest that a systematic attack on the Tutsi civilian population
existed throughout Rwanda in 1994.104

C.

Cases in the ICTY

The threshold of a systematic attack is very similar in the ICTY as it is in the ICTR.
Courts in the ICTY look at the improbability of the attack’s random occurrence. In the
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, murder, unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian property,
wanton destruction not justified by military necessity, and plunder of public and private property
all occurred within at least eight different towns.105 The Court held that due to the improbability
of this random occurrence, then these attacks must be characterized as systematic.106 The Court
went on to say that, “Patterns of crimes, in the sense of the non-accidental repetition of similar
criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common expression of such systematic occurrence.”107
In the Brdjanin case, the Court held there to be a systematic attack where there was a plan
to gain control over certain areas and create a separate Bosnian Serb state by removing most of
the people who were non-Serbs.108 To implement this plan, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were removed from their jobs, murdered, tortured, beaten, raped, and their property
plundered.109 “Tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forcibly

104

Id. at para. 360.
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 December 2004 at paras. 667-668
[Reproduced in notebook at Tab 11].
106
Id. at para. 669.
107
Id. at para. 666.
108
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36, Trial Chamber, September 1, 2004, para. 65 [Reproduced in notebook at Tab
21]. This plan was known as the “Strategic Plan” whereby Bosnian Serb leadership and members of the Serbian
Democratic Party would gain control over certain areas to create their separate Bosnian Serb state.
109
Id. at para. 157.
105

24

expelled.”110 The existence of this plan, therefore, was enough to satisfy the threshold of
systematic within the Yugoslavian context.
In the Stakic case, a plan to remove non-Serbs from an area/region also constituted a
systematic attack according to the Court.111 Where attacks on non-Serbs occurred within an area,
killing hundreds and arresting many others, the Court held that this was pursuant to a plan
prepared on January 7, 1992 by the Assembly of the Serbian People in Prijedor.112 Specifically,
the plan to remove non-Serbs was “activated by the takeover of power by Serbs on April 30,
1992. Thereafter the attack directed against the civilian population intensified, according to the
plan.”113 Thus, the Court was satisfied that the attack against the non-Serbs was sufficiently
systematic.
Furthermore, the Court in the Prosecutor v. Kunarac et. al. held there to be a systematic
attack where abuses occurred in three municipalities.114 Within the municipalities:
Muslim civilians were removed from their social and professional lives . . .most Muslim
men were disarmed . . .complete ostracism soon followed with their freedom to move
about and to gather critically curtailed . . .outbursts of violence and house-burning
[became] more frequent . . .women were kept in various detention centres where they
[were subjected] to . . .unhygienic conditions . . .being raped repeatedly.115
In addition, the men were detained for no reason and also subjected to the inhumane living
conditions. The Court held that it was satisfied that there was a systematic attack on the Muslim
civilian population in the municipalities of Foca, Gacko and Kalinovik.116 The threshold within
this context appears to be that a systematic attack occurred due to the improbability of a random
110
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occurrence in three different municipalities and that the attack was only directed against the
Muslim civilian population. This led the Appeals Chamber to uphold that there were “patterns of
crimes—that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis,”
which ultimately is a “common expression” of a systematic attack.117
In Naletilic, the Court held there to be a systematic attack where the attack “took many
forms.”118 The attack in Mostar, Sovici, and Doljani took many forms which is why the Court
held that this constituted a systematic attack. The Court noted that:
It started with the collection and detention of Muslim civilians after the fierce fighting
around Sovici and Doljani and their subsequent transfer to detention centres . . . The
Muslim houses in the area were burnt to make sure that there would be no return of the
Muslim population. Muslim religious sites, like the mosques in the area, were
systematically destroyed. Detention facilities for the Muslim part of the population were
established all over the area. Detained Muslim civilians and Muslim soldiers hors de
combat were often subjected to humiliating and brutal mistreatment by soldiers who had
unfettered access to the detention facilities.119
Because of all the different “forms” of the attacks, the Court ruled that it was not so likely that
this could have been done by accident. Therefore, the organized nature of these acts and the fact
that this was highly improbable120 led the Court to hold that these sufficiently constituted a
systematic attack against the Muslim civilian population.121
In the Blaskic decision, the Court held there to be a systematic attack where the military
units responded in a “perfectly co-ordinated manner presuppos[ing] [the] fact that those troops
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were responding to a single command.”122 In that case, the Court adopted the view of a
professional soldier who gave his opinion on the matter:
I believe that one or two minor cases may have been committed by small, uncontrolled
groups, but the large-scale and systematic manner in which these events took place, entire
villages being burned, and other villages, we saw that it was the Muslim houses that were
systematically selected, and we saw that the same type of events were taking place at the
same time period in different locations, and it would be impossible, in my opinion, for
this to have been carried out by uncontrolled groups.123
The Court noted that this opinion was also the opinion of Blaskic himself.124 The main purpose
of some of the orders was to incite racial hatred while other orders invoked the prompt action of
the soldiers.125 In addition, victim testimony demonstrated that civilians were killed in response
to orders.126 Therefore, in this context, the Court was satisfied that it was highly improbable that
this was a random occurrence or an accident.

V.

Analysis of “Widespread” and “Systematic” in the Cambodian Context
A.

Widespread

1. Nuon Chea

Nuon Chea, also known as Brother Number Two, had a leading role within the Khmer
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Rouge.127 There is overwhelming evidence that he had a leading role in developing and
implementing the execution policies of the CPK.128 Chea ordered Duch to kill roughly 300
Khmer Rouge soldiers.129 In addition, Chea ordered Duch to kill the remaining prisoners a few
days before the Vietnamese arrived.130 Not only was Chea mainly responsible for the purges and
ordering executions, the evidence suggests that Chea at least had knowledge of what was
happening.131 Chea made various telegrams which “solicited instructions or authorization to
detain or execute suspected traitors.”132 While Pol Pot directed the search for “enemies within
the Party,” Nuon Chea was the one who “did the work” by arresting a massive amount of CPK
members and ordering their killings.133 Not only did Chea order the killings of CPK members,
he demanded proof of the bodies of the people that were killed.134
It is possible that Chea’s ordering the execution of 300 Khmer Rouge soldiers could
constitute a widespread attack. Overall, up to two million people were executed during 19751979 in Cambodia in what was known as the “killing fields.’’135 Chea supervised, authorized,
and instructed the killing of hundreds of people. As evidenced from the cases in the different
tribunals, courts have held there to be a widespread attack where there has been substantially less
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than two million deaths.136 In the Cambodian context, a quarter of the population of Cambodia
was exterminated.
As evidenced by the numerous telegrams from Chea authorizing, instructing, or receiving
notice that people were being tortured and executed, this could be evidence that Chea knew of
the attacks. Chea also knew of the attacks because he “exercised the highest level of command
authority during the regime.”137 The argument, therefore, would be that the person with the
highest level of command authority must know what is happening especially since almost two
million people died under his authority. So, therefore, even if Chea’s actions are not deemed to
be “widespread”, they are certainly part of a widespread attack. To borrow the language from
the Tadic Court in the ICTY, “The perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian
population [and] know that his act fits in with the attack.”138 Chea, via his correspondence with
his subordinates, most definitely knew that his acts were part of a broader widespread attack
against the civilian population. Thus, even if Chea’s numerous authorizations and participations
of mass executions do not constitute a widespread attack, they are most definitely part of a
widespread attack.
In addition, there is evidence of mass burial pits, prisons, and torture devices in at least
sixteen of Cambodia’s seventeen provinces and 170 districts.139 This demonstrates the largescale nature of these attacks. The scale of attacks in this instance is greater than in the Stakic
case, where the large scale acts only occurred within three different municipalities and spread to
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the Brdo region.140 Here, the attacks occurred in virtually every province and in 170 districts,
not just three. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to rule that there was not a widespread attack
in the Cambodian context.

2. Ieng Sary

Sary was a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) Center and a Deputy
Prime Minister in charge of foreign affairs.141 He made public speeches and recorded comments
to journalists supporting the arrests of the enemies and he personally admitted knowing that the
arrests were made.142 He publicly described the policies of executing the enemies to the Khmer
Rouge, which, without question, helped incite further crimes.143 He stated: “[We] have smashed
all the enemies’ tricks, crushed their spy network and succeeded in preserving our national
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the sacred fruits of our revolution.”144 After
Sary’s speech to execute all the enemies, a “large-scale intra-party purge” occurred.145 Many
internal reports also described some of the atrocities committed, and Sary made statements either
contemporaneously to those atrocities or after the fact.146 Some of which, Sary praised the
killings and arrests of certain civilians.147 In addition, Sary played a personal role in arresting,
torturing, and executing certain cadre officials.148 A confession by San Pau stated that he was
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arrested and sent to the S-21 to be executed.149 Sary was involved in the arrest of many officials,
fifty cadre, and other personnel who were later executed.150 Finally, Sary was a part of the
telegram communications between Nuon Chea and other senior officials reporting on the status
of the arrests, executions, and tortures of the “enemies.”151
The evidence stacked up against Sary may not necessarily suggest a widespread attack.
Sary did not directly order thousands of people to be executed or tortured. Nonetheless, he
ordered his subordinates to do so, thus satisfying the requirement that he at least have knowledge
of the attacks. The numerous telegrams sent to him or by him referring to the executions of the
officials directly also demonstrate Sary’s knowledge of a widespread attack. In addition, he
publicly gave statements to kill any traitors of the regime which would be further evidence of his
knowledge of the attacks. In Tadic, he was found guilty of crimes against humanity where he
murdered four people as part of a widespread attack.152 Therefore, Sary’s involvement of the
arrests and executions of fifty cadres would be more than enough to constitute the “single act”
committed as part of a widespread attack. As stated previously, a widespread attack occurred
where almost two million people were killed in sixteen different provinces and in 170 districts.153
By participating in the executions, Sary’s actions were linked to the widespread attack in
Cambodia. Thus, it would only take a single act from Sary in addition to his knowledge that a
widespread attack was occurring. To conclude, Sary’s actions will most likely be found to be
committed as part of a widespread attack.

149

Id. at 71, citing Responses of San Pau, State Market Combatant: On the History of His Own Treasonous
Activities, 2 August 1978 (BBKKh353).
150
Heder and Tittemore, supra note 1, at 73.
151
Id. at 75
152
Prosecutor v. Tadic IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 125. [Reproduced in notebook at
Tab 10]
153
Ramji and VanSchaack, supra note 127, at 273.

31

3. Khieu Samphan

Khieu Samphan was the former Chairman of the DK State Presidium who also occupied
various CPK positions.154 Proof that Samphan participated in various crimes is not very
extensive; however, Samphan publicly endorsed the policies of executing the “enemy agents.’’155
He also confessed that he had knowledge of the arrests and executions but denies that there were
any mass executions.156 Samphan worked, via his role of Chairman of Office 870, with Nuon
Chea to ensure that Samphan was carrying out the general purges that his superiors ordered.157
Thus, Samphan never took any steps to prevent the execution policies that he knew were
occurring, and in fact, he made public statements supporting those policies. In one speech,
Samphan stated that he was not worried about the purges of cadre members because they could
be replaced with better cadre.158 Finally, another statement by Samphan’s Office of the Vice
President of Democratic Kampuchea for Foreign Affairs stated that, “at least 3,000 minor
offenders or innocent civilians were wrongfully executed by the CPK regime,”159 and another
8,000 people were executed for trying to overthrow DK.160
Certainly, 3,000 people “wrongfully” executed, which does not include the number of
people executed because they were thought to be traitors, is a high number. This number alone
could sufficiently constitute a widespread attack according to international jurisprudence. In one
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of the leading cases in the ICTR, the Court held that there was a sufficient widespread attack
where Akayesu was responsible for the deaths of 2,000 Tutsis.161 In the case with Samphan,
there were a total of 11,000 people executed for cause or for no reason at all. Since this number
is higher than that of the Akayesu case, and the total number of victims in Cambodia is higher
than that of Rwanda, this would appear to meet the threshold for a widespread attack.

4.

Kae Pok

Pok was the former Secretary of the North/Central Zone and member of the Central
Committee and played a huge role in the executions and arrests of traitors within his zone.162
There are reports of hundreds of prisoners brought into Pok’s zone who were detained and
executed.163 At least four confessions from cadre were directly addressed to Pok, which suggests
that Pok knew about the executions and arrests. The evidence also suggests that Pok participated
in some of the arrests which ultimately led to the executions.164 One confession stated that all the
members of a group who lived under cover in the Koki Thom sub-district were “smashed.”165
Thus, while there is no final number on the amount of people killed by Kae Pok or his authority,
there certainly were multiple acts with which Pok was involved.
In the case at bar, Pok had more than adequate knowledge that there were widespread
attacks occurring because of the amount of confessions he received. He was responsible for the
161
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lower-level cadre who carried out the executions at Pok’s orders of people deemed to be traitors
to the regime.166 This would be strong evidence of Pok’s knowledge of widespread attacks
occurring throughout Cambodia. Thus, under international jurisprudence, even one act would be
sufficient to satisfy the “widespread” requirement.
It is also possible that Pok’s actions could alone constitute a widespread attack. Pok was
responsible for hundreds of deaths and he ordered his subordinates to kill thousands more.167
While there is no specific number of people alleged to be killed by Pok, the fact that it reached
the “thousands” could satisfy the threshold of a widespread attack. In Akayesu, the Court was
satisfied that a widespread attack occurred where he was responsible for 2,000 deaths. In this
case, Pok was responsible for thousands of deaths so this would satisfy the threshold of a
widespread attack even though the number is not known. Even if the number of victims alone
does not satisfy the threshold, a court could also look at the “many forms” of the attacks that
occurred under Pok’s authority. In the Brdjanin case, the Court held that an attack satisfied the
threshold of a widespread attack where the attack “took many forms.”168 Here, villagers were
arrested, tortured, and executed, cadre officials were tortured and executed, people were forced
into servitude, and religiously persecuted.169 Therefore, one can make the argument that these
attacks “took many forms,” and, taken together with the thousands of people Pok was
responsible for, these acts triggered the “widespread” threshold.
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B.

Systematic
1.

Nuon Chea

Nuon Chea’s involvement in the regime can most definitely be characterized as
systematic. Not only did Chea have knowledge of a systematic attack, but he was one of the
primary people responsible for the policies.170 Chea was quoted as making a statement in the
1975 Party Congress saying, “We must get rid of former soldiers from the old regime; they will
not change their ideas, so we have to smash them all.”171 A confession of a former West Zone
Secretary said that in 1976, Chea told him to execute all former Khmer Republic Soldiers in his
district “because it was not easy for them to abandon their old ideas.”172 Also, Chea demanded
that evidence of the executions be brought to him so he could see pictures of the dead bodies.173
Further evidence of a plan or policy is that Duch confessed to receiving direct orders from Chea
himself to execute former officials and Chea was noted in various telegrams for authorizing
executions and detentions.174
The broad extent to which Chea is documented as having implemented policies and plans
indicates the systematic nature of the attacks. Chea was a high-ranking official, serving only to
Pol Pot.175 Since Chea ordered the killings of many former officials and people deemed to be
traitors to the new regime, one can infer that Chea had knowledge of the systematic attacks. In
addition, there were 19,733 mass graves and 196 prisons.176 Chea had the responsibility of
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overseeing what occurred in those prisons.177 The sheer volume of mass graves and prisons
demonstrate the improbability of a random occurrence of deaths. This is not something that
could have been by accident. The systematic threshold is triggered since Chea was in a position
to know of the systematic nature of the killings because he was the person ordering the killings
and he often times received the dead bodies as proof of their deaths. Also, since the threshold
was triggered in the Kunarac case178 where killings occurred in three different municipalities,
and the attacks in Cambodia were in numerous cities and towns, then the systematic threshold
will be triggered because it is highly improbable that this was a random occurrence.

2. Ieng Sary

Since Sary was the Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs, he used this position to
make public speeches and on-the-record remarks to foreign journalists supporting the arrests of
“enemy agents” in the Communist Party of Kampuchea and their executions.179 Sary, by
endorsing an execution policy, and by using his power of a senior official, encouraged others to
perform other executions.180 For example, Sary endorsed a policy made by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea,
Son Sen, and Khieu Samphan to “conduct a massive purge of the East Zone.”181 In addition,
Sary was copied on the various telegrams sent to Nuon Chea requesting executions of various
former military personnel.182
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The evidence also suggests that Sary was aware of the systematic nature of the attacks
occurring around him. The telegrams which he was copied to, the public statements endorsing
the executions and arrests of the enemies, and endorsements of the giant purging plan of the
Eastern Zone made by Pol Pot and Nuon Chea indicate that this was highly unlikely to be a
random occurrence. There was a definite plan or policy in place to exterminate those deemed to
be enemies of the regime. By having Pol Pot and Nuon Chea come up with the plan, and then
having Ieng Sary distribute this plan via public statements indicates that this was no accident or
random occurrence. This would be most analogous to the Stakic case since the Court ruled that
there was a systematic attack after a plan was adopted to eradicate non-Serbs and thereafter, the
attacks intensified. 183 Similarly, in the case involving Ieng Sary, he adopted the plans of the top
officials (Pol Pot and Nuon Chea) and publicly encouraged the executions of anybody deemed to
be a traitor to the regime. Therefore, this intensifies the case against Ieng Sary in that the acts
constituted a systematic attack to which he had knowledge.

3. Khieu Samphan

Khieu Samphan, like Ieng Sary, also made public statements supporting the efforts to
execute the traitors.184 Samphan also occupied various senior positions within the regime.185
Samphan has conceded knowledge of the executions and arrests of various military and political

183

Prosecutor v. Stakic, IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, Judgment, July 31, 2003, para. 630. [Reproduced in notebook at
Tab 22]. .
184
Id. at p. 84. Samphan exalted in the fact that the alleged traitors were already arrested for planning to overthrow
the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
185
Id. at p. 80-81. Samphan was a Central Committee member and “privy to the policies originating from that body,
including the policy of arresting and executing persons suspected of being enemies of the regime.” He also was
Chairman of “Office 870” and his duties entailed keeping track of the implementation of policies adopted by the
Standing Committee. He was also the “note taker” for Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Son Sen at a secret meeting where
they agreed to execute the Eastern Zone military and political cadre.

37

cadre.186 This makes it easier to prove his knowledge of a systematic attack. This would be
analogous to the Blaskic decision in that Blaskic acknowledged the atrocities that were
occurring.187 Here, Samphan also acknowledges that he knew of various arrests and executions.
Since Samphan was privy to Nuon Chea and Pol Pot, one can also infer that he knew of the
degree of the executions occurring. Most especially, Samphan was the note taker of the secret
meeting where Nuon Chea, Pol Pot, and Son Sen adopted a plan to exterminate the Eastern Zone
from the military and political cadre. In this respect, it is similar to the Rutaganda case, where
meetings were held to discuss the extermination of the Tutsi.188 Samphan even stated on one
occasion that he was not concerned with the purges depleting the ranks of the cadre because
“they could be replaced with newer and better cadre.”189 This evidence makes it highly
improbable that it was by mere chance that Samphan had the same policy as Nuon Chea and Pol
Pot in executing people deemed to be enemies. It is also highly improbable that this policy was a
mere random occurrence which happened to spread across the entire country. Thus, it is likely
that the Court will hold that Samphan engaged in systematic attacks and that he knew he was
acting as part of a systematic attack.

4. Kae Pok
190

Kae Pok also played a direct role in the executions of the cadre. Like the other

individuals discussed above, Kae Pok implemented execution policies of former cadre and
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military personnel.191 Kae Pok oversaw the movement of prisoners from his region
(North/Central Zone) to the S-21 killing fields.192 Even many of Pok’s own subordinates were
arrested and executed.193 This implies Pok’s knowledge of the organized plan or policy designed
to root out anybody deemed to be a traitor to the regime. Many confessions were sent to Pok
which described the atrocities occurring which also demonstrate Pok’s knowledge and
involvement in the executions, arrests, and torture.194 Pok sent a telegram targeting the Islamic
Cham, ex-Khmer Republic soldiers and dissident cadre as people who were in opposition to the
regime.195 This is similar to the Kunarac case where the Court noted that only Muslims were the
target of the attacks which demonstrates that it was systematic.196 Here, there is evidence that
Pok targeted two groups of people: Islamic Cham and ex-Khmer Republic soldiers. This is a
prime example of a systematic attack where the plan or policy evidences a targeted attack against
a specific group of people. The proof of a plan is easier to identify where the plan tries to
eliminate a specific class. In this case, the plan was to eliminate people in opposition to the
regime, and Pok specifically mentioned that the Islamic Cham and the ex-Khmer Republic
soldiers were the ones in opposition to the regime.197

Furthermore, Pok asked the Central Committee to help him identify two people he
personally arrested in March of 1978 which further exhibits Pok’s participation in the systematic
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attacks.198 He also sent a telegram to the Central Committee attesting to his direct involvement
in the atrocities committed within his zone.199 The telegram documents the arrests of cadre who
“participat[ed] in opposition activities and promise[d] to take measures against any other
‘undercover links’ in the revolutionary ranks that his surveillance uncovered.”200 Pok’s
statement in this telegram is also similar to the Musema case where there were chants of, “Let’s
exterminate them!”201 In that case, the Court held that there was a systematic attack since the
objective was clearly determined to be to exterminate the Tutsi.202 In the case against Pok, the
evidence is also clear that the purpose of the telegram sent by Pok was to eliminate anybody in
opposition to the regime. With this evidence, it is difficult for Pok to claim that the attacks were
not systematic in nature. The telegram is direct proof of Pok communicating with Pol Pot and
verifying the plan or policy to eliminate those in opposition to the regime. Therefore, not only
were these acts very difficult, if not impossible to be random occurrences, but they were also the
result of a very meticulous, well-thought out plan or policy to rid the regime of people who could
potentially be traitors. Thus, in the case against Pok, it is likely that he triggered the threshold of
a systematic attack.

VI.

Conclusion

A.

Widespread
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To conclude, the applicable law does not dictate that there be a mandatory minimum
number when assessing a widespread attack.203 However, in the various tribunals examined, the
Courts have held there to be a widespread attack when there have been thousands of deaths
linked together. Where 2,000 deaths occurred in Rwanda, the Court held that this satisfied the
threshold of a widespread attack.204 Also, where one act of murder was committed within the
context of a widespread attack, the threshold of a widespread attack was satisfied as long as the
perpetrator knew his acts were part of a widespread attack.205
The “widespread” requirement must be committed on a large scale by the “cumulative
effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary
magnitude.”206 No tribunal has ever attempted to define ‘extraordinary magnitude’ or make a
minimum number. Nonetheless, the Limaj case determined that 100-140 people affected is not
sufficient within the context of Kosovo’s population to be considered “widespread”.207 Yet, the
Stakic case held that the “whole of the Brdo region” was sufficiently broad and large-scaled for
the Court to hold that the attacks occurring there constituted a widespread attack even though
only hundreds of non-Serbs were killed.208 Therefore, we see that a court could hold that a
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widespread attack exists where it is committed throughout various cities/regions and are all
linked together even if the number of victims do not rise to the level of ‘thousands.’
In the Cambodian context, substantial evidence of the number of victims, the frequency
of the attacks, and the vast coverage of the acts indicate that various members of the Khmer
Rouge have triggered the threshold of a “widespread” attack.

B.

Systematic

It is problematic for the individuals discussed above to claim that there was not a
systematic attack. As we saw, the plan to eliminate any potential traitors to the regime was
manifest throughout all the different zones. It is too improbable that the same policy of torturing
and executing people, which was implemented in at least sixteen of the seventeen provinces was
the result of a mere accident or coincidence. Rather, there was a meticulous plan to gain control
and rid Cambodia of the people thought to be traitors to the regime. Many people were forced
into confessing that they were traitors, and as a result, many innocent people died. In all, almost
two million civilians died during the period of 1975-1979.209 The policy of ridding Cambodia of
other civilians is further evidenced by a radio broadcasted speech by Pol Pot where he stated that
“[each] of us must kill thirty Vietnamese . . .[this] would be more than enough because Vietnam
has only fifty million inhabitants.”210 This message by “Brother Number One” sends a clear
message: Kill the Vietnamese! Furthermore, religious groups were also targeted in addition to
the Vietnamese and the people deemed to be in opposition to the regime.211 Evidence also
suggests that checkpoints were set up on each major road leading out of Phnom Penh in April
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1975 in order to filter out former Lon Nol officials.212 Finally, the clearest description of a
systematic attack was in the “killing fields.” Him Huy, a cadre member who admits to driving
prisoners to Choeung Ek described the mass killings process.213 He stated:
“Once a month, or every three weeks, two or three trucks” took prisoners from S-21 to
Choeung Ek. Prisoners were assembled together, their names were checked off against
execution lists prepared by Suos Thi of S-21’s documentation branch. Then, prisoners were
“ordered to kneel down at the edge of the hole [with] their hands tied before them. They were
beaten on the back of the neck with an iron ox-cart axle. [A man named Ho] inspected the
killings and I recorded the names.”214 Thus, the regularity of these offenses being at least once a
month and the atrocious nature of the killings indicate that these attacks were pursuant to a
policy or plan, and not the result of a random occurrence. Moreover, the individuals discussed
above were all aware that there were systematic attacks occurring and they were acting pursuant
to the plan to rid Cambodia of “traitors.” Therefore, it is very likely that these individuals have
all triggered the threshold of a systematic attack.
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APPENDIX --CHART
WIDESPREAD
Action

Analysis

One murder in the context of thousands dead.215

Found to be part of a
widespread attack.

2,000 deaths.216

Widespread attack.

All vital functions of the town taken over217

Widespread attack.

Hundreds dead throughout three different municipalities
and spreading to the “whole of the Brdo region.”218

Widespread attack.

7,000 people massacred.219

Widespread attack

100-140 abductions.220

Not widespread. Not linked
to the other attacks going on.

SYSTEMATIC

Shipping in extra weapons to the country; killing
a specific type of people, media broadcasts encouraging
killings.221
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Systematic
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Clearly audible chants of “Let’s exterminate them!”222

Systematic

Meetings of high-ranking officers,
roadblocks, media broadcasts all of which
encouraging the killings of specific civilians.223

Systematic

Plan to gain control evidenced by the citizens
losing their jobs, getting beaten, murdered, raped,
and the plundering of property.224

Systematic

Patterns of crimes occurring within three
separate municipalities.225

Systematic

Military troops responding in a perfectly coordinated
manner by killing thousands of civilians.226

Systematic
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